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Comment

Rejecting the Adage "Children Should Be
Seen and Not Heard" -

The Mature

Minor Doctrine
I.

Introduction

In July 1994, fifteen year old Benny Agrelo discussed the
debate surrounding his October 1993 decision to stop taking
anti-rejection medication and forego a third liver transplant:
[The doctors] don't realize how bad the pain is, of course, they
would never realize it, unless they were going through it themselves, but their job is to keep their patients alive for as long as
they can. I mean, that's their job. [B]ut they should learn when
to step out of the way. When a patient doesn't want treatment
[sic].'
Benny's decision to stop taking the anti-rejection medication
was met with state interference. 2 When an administrator at
Pittsburgh Children's Hospital, where Benny had received his
two liver transplants, notified the Florida Department of
Health and Rehabilitation Services (hereinafter HRS) that
Benny was not taking his medication, HRS forcibly removed
Benny from his home. 3 Once hospitalized, doctors attempted to
1. ABC News PrimeTime Live: Benny's Choice - Children and the Right to Decide (ABC television broadcast, July 7, 1994) (hereinafter PRIMETIME LIVE). Benny
stated that the medication caused him to be "in pain all the time and [that he was]
not... able to do anything for [himselfl." Id.
2. PRIMETIME LivE, supra note 1.
3. Nancy San Martin, Defiant TransplantPatient Dies at Home, SUN SENTI-

Aug. 21, 1994, at 8A, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database. Benny
stated that when he was carried to the ambulance "[he] was so angry, [he] put [his]
elbow through the window without even thinking about it. They had to tie [him]
NEL,

down and it hurt [him]." PRIME TIME

LIvE,

supra note 1.
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give Benny liver biopsies and medication but Benny "managed
4
to fight them off alone."
Benny's decision to stop taking the anti-rejection medications made national news when Broward County Circuit Court
Judge Arthur Birken ruled that Benny could not be forced to
take the medications. 5 Although under Florida law a child has
no right to stop taking life-saving medication, 6 Judge Birken
based his controversial ruling on his long visit with Benny
which included four hours of testimony from doctors who had
treated the boy.7 Benny died in his home on August 20, 1994,8
two and one- half months after Judge Birken's ruling. 9 Benny's
story fueled the national debate over whether a minor has the
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.1 0
More recently, Billy Best, a sixteen year old diagnosed with
Hodgkin's disease in August 1994,11 ran away from his Massachusetts home on October 26, 1994, after two and one-half
months of chemotherapy. 12 Billy left a letter for his parents in
which he stated: "[t]he reason I left is because I could not stand
going to the hospital every week. I feel like the medicine is kill4. PRIME TIME LrVE, supra note 1. Benny's mother initially did not support
her son's position to stop taking his medication; however, she later "[blacked his
decision after some struggle." Teen Shunned Medication, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 21,
1994, at 1A, availablein WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
5. Florida Teen Who Refused Liver Drug Dies, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 21,
1994, at 8A, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database. Judge Birken has not
issued a formal opinion on this controversial ruling because the matter involved a
parental neglect action. Telephone interview with Judge Birken's office (Sept. 6,
1994).
6. PRIME TIME LivE, supra note 1.
7. PRIME TIME LIVE, supra note 1. Benny indicated that his decision to stop
taking anti-rejection medication (eight medications, three times a day), which doctors said would have extended his life, was based on the side effects of the medication which included headaches, fevers and swelling of his arms and legs. PRIME
TIME LIVE, supra note 1.
8. Amy Driscoll, Teen Shunned Medication, MLin HERALD, Aug. 21, 1994, at
1A,available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
9. Martin, supra note 3.
10. Gail B. Slap & Martha M. Jablow, DebatingRights of Young Patients,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at C1.
11. Morose, Boy with Cancer Runs Away 'Medication is Killing Me Instead of
Helping Me', CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 4, 1994, News at 26, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS Database.
12. Slap & Jablow, supra note 10.
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ing me instead of helping me.... ."13 When Billy was informed
that he would require four months of chemotherapy, he sold
some of his belongings, and boarded a bus with his
skateboard. 14 Billy ended up in Houston, Texas "where he fell
in with some skateboarding friends and lived in abandoned
buildings. Later, he was taken in by two families." 15 After seeing his family's plea for his return on television, Billy returned
home on November 21, 1994.16 At a news conference held after
Billy's return, his father stated that his son's future treatments
17
would not include chemotherapy. '
This Comment will address the rights of mature minors to
make informed medical decisions regarding their refusal of lifesustaining treatment. Part II details the traditional legal status of minors and explores judicial recognition of the mature
minor's right to consent to medical treatment. This section also
provides an overview of court decisions which accepted and rejected the notion of extending the common law right to refuse
life-sustaining medial treatment to minors. Part II further explores the recent guidelines set forth by the Midwest Bioethics
Committee, which proposed that minors with decisional capacity be afforded the right to refuse medical treatment. 18
13. Around the Nation -CancerPatientRuns Away, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1994,
at A4, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
14. Christopher B. Daly, Teenage Cancer Patient Seeks Normalcy - Chemotherapy Will Not be Partof Treatment, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1994, at A3, available
in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
15. Id.
16. Runaway CancerPatientGoes Home, CI. ThIB., Nov. 22, 1994, News at 4,
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
17. Christopher B. Daly, Teenage CancerPatientSeeks to Return to Normalcy
- Chemotherapy Will Not be Partof Treatment, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1994, at A3,
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database. Instead, Billy began taking Essiac, an herbal drink, as an alternative form of treatment for his cancer. Gloria
Negri, Youth Seeks 'Alternative'Cure, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1995, at 22, available
inWESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database. In April 1995, the Dana Farber Institute in
Boston announced that Billy's new tests did not reveal any trace of Hodgkin's disease. Pattie Hainer, Cancer Runaway Billy Best Doing Well, Living on, THE PATRIoT LEDGER, May 15, 1995, at 8B, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS
Database. The following month Billy's parents stated: "We're glad now that he
ran away. We would never have known about alternative treatments if he hadn't."
Id.
18. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, HEALTH CARE TREATMENT DECISION MAKING
GUIDELINES FOR MINORS (1994-95) (hereinafter MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER).

3
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Part III of this Comment examines the current statutory
enactments which allow minors to consent to medical treatment
under certain circumstances, and sets forth the conflict within
New York lower courts over whether or not minors have the
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Additionally,
this section focuses on the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law, which recommended that mature minors should
play a substantial role in the decision to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. 19 It also addresses the Task Force suggestion that
bioethics committees assist in resolving conflicts between mature minors and their parents over the minor's decision to
legislaforego medical treatment,2 0 and the resulting proposed
21
Law.
Health
Public
York
New
tion to amend the
Part IV of this Comment explores the role the courts and
the legislature should play in granting mature minors the right
to forego life-sustaining treatment. This section suggests that
the New York Legislature should enact a law granting mature
minors the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
Part IV also examines how recently proposed legislation balances the minor's interest in refusing treatment, the parental
interest in speaking for their children on health care issues, and
the state's interest in preserving life. Finally, Part IV concludes
that more appropriate safeguards need to be established for assessing the decision-making capacity of minors who desire to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
II.
A.

Background

The Legal Status of Children

Minors have traditionally been characterized as legal incompetents. 22 In 1944, the United States Supreme Court in
19. THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS
MUST CHOOSE, DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY 131 (1992) (hereinafter

NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE).
20. Id. at 131-32.
21. Id. app. A.
22. See In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157, 159 (1890) ("The age at which an infant
shall be competent to do any acts or perform any duties, military or civil, depends
wholly upon the legislature.") (citations omitted); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121,
122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ("here is general recognition of the fact that many persons by
reason of their youth are incapable of intelligent decision [sic], as the result of
which public policy demands legal protection of their personal as well as their

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss2/13

4

1996]

MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE

427

Prince v. Massachusetts,23 noted the parental right to speak for
minor children, but qualified this right by stating that
"[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the
age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
for themselves."24 The state has the power to act as parenspatriae in order to protect the safety and welfare of the children
25
within its jurisdiction.
Thirty-five years after Prince, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the parental right to speak for minor children when it
stated that parents primarily speak for their minor children in
matters concerning medical treatment. 26 At the same time, the
Court acknowledged that children "[have] a substantial liberty
interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment .... 27 Although the right of minors to refuse medical
treatment has not been addressed by the Supreme Court, it has
been addressed by lower courts. 28
property rights."); In re Alfonso v. Fernandez, 195 A.D.2d 46, 50-51, 606 N.Y.S.2d
259, 262 (2d Dep't 1993), ("As legal incompetents, minors could no more consent to
medical treatment than they could enter into binding contracts and they continued
to be incompetent in many circumstances to give effective consent to health care."),
appeal dismissed, 83 N.Y.2d 906, 637 N.E.2d 278, 614 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1994). For a
discussion of Alfonso, see infra note 175. See also DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HuMAN SERVICES, THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS - 1980 28 (1980)(the disabilities of minors are removed by operation of the law when the minor reaches the age
of majority).
23. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
24. Id. at 170.
25. Id. at 166. " 'Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability
such as juveniles or the insane." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). See
Parham v. JR, 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("[A] state is not without constitutional
control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or
mental health is jeopardized.") See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230
(1972).
26. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03. The Court noted that, "[tihe law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions." Id. at 602. The Court further stated "[mlost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions,
including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make
those judgments." Id. at 603.
27. Id. at 600.
28. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (11l. 1989); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me.
1990); In re Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 147 Misc.2d 724, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239
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The Emergence of the Mature Minor Doctrine

Adults, unlike minors, have a common law right of self-determination.29 While the United States Supreme Court has
never ruled that a competent adult has a constitutional right to
refuse medical treatment, the divided Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,30 assumed that the United States
Constitution would grant a competent adult the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment. 31 However, "the Cruzan decision
gave virtually no intelligible principles to the states for protecting incompetent persons' liberty interest in forgoing life-sus32
taining procedures."
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1990); In re Thomas B., 152 Misc. 2d 96, 574 N.Y.S.2d
659 (Farn. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1991); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739
(Tenn. 1987); O.G., P.G., and M.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
For a discussion of E.G., see infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Swan, see infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., see infra notes 181-198 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Thomas B., see infra notes 199-205 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Cardwell, see infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of O.G., see infra notes 114-139 and accompanying text.
29. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.").
30. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
31. Id. The Court based this principle on the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court further stated
that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a [Fourteenth Amendment] constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
[could] be inferred from [its] prior decisions." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
In Cruzan, 30 year old Nancy Cruzan's parents sought to have their daughter's artificial nutrition and hydration systems removed. Id. at 267. Nancy had
been in a persistent vegetative state for many years as a result of a car accident.
Id. at 266, n.1. The Court in Cruzan held that the state of Missouri had a legitimate interest in protecting human life, and upheld as constitutional Missouri's
standard of requiring clear and convincing evidence that, prior to being in a persistent vegetative state, the patient manifested a desire to have life-sustaining artificial feeding and hydration removed. Id. at 286-87.
To date, in addition to Missouri, Michigan and New York allow treatment to
be withheld only when supported by clear and convincing evidence that a patient,
while competent, expressly decided to reject the treatment in the circumstances
present. See In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995); In re Westchester County
Medical Ctr., 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 609, 534 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1988).
32. Scott Allan Frick, The Right to Forgo Life-Sustaining ProceduresIn Florida: Is Florida "Cruzan-Proof"?,20 STETSON L. REV. 519, 524 (1991).
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Prior to the 1986 holding in In re D.P.,33 no court had examined whether a minor had the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. 34 In In re D.P., a fourteen year old cancer
patient refused blood transfusions because it was against her
religion. 35 The minor stated that she would leave the hospital if
the court ordered the transfusions.3 6 The court did not order
the transfusions, holding that the girl could not be kept in the
hospital against her will.3 7 Although no state legislature has
passed a law giving minors the right to refuse medical treatment, recently, some courts have recognized a common law
right of minors both to refuse and to consent to medical
38
treatment.
In determining whether minors have a common law right to
consent to medical treatment, courts have considered whether
the minor has the capacity to consent to, and appreciate the nature, risks, and consequences of the medical treatment involved. 39 Courts have also attempted to determine whether
there was clear and convincing evidence that the comatose minor, prior to treatment, did not want to be maintained by lifesustaining procedures. 4° Recognition of a mature minor's right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment developed as a re33. William D. Brewster, Note, In re E.G., a Minor: Death Over Life: A Judicial Trend Continues as the Illinois Supreme Court Grants Minors the Right to
Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 771 n.5 (1990) (citing In re D.P., No. 91950 (Santa Clara County Juv. Ct. July 3, 1986)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me.
1990); Cardwell v. Bechtel, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987). For a discussion of E.G.,
see infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Swan, see infra
notes 82-102 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Cardwell, see infra notes
42-60 and accompanying text. One court has, however, refused to recognize such a
common law right. See O.G., P.G., and M.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990). For a discussion of O.G., see infra notes 114-139 and accompanying
text.
39. See Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 749. See also E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327 (mature
minor doctrine affords the minor, whom the trial judge deems is mature enough to
appreciate the consequences of his/her actions, the right to consent to or refuse
medical treatment). For a discussion of Cardwell, see infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion of E.G., see infra notes 61-81 and accompanying
text.
40. See Swan, 569 A.2d at 1206. For a discussion of Swan, see infra notes 82102 and accompanying text.
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sult of the Illinois Supreme Court's expansion of the statutory
41
right to consent to medical treatment.
1.

Capacity to Consent to Medical Treatment

In 1987, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Bechtol,42 a case of first impression in Tennessee, 4 recognized a mature minor exception to the common law rule that requires a
physician to obtain consent from parents before the physician
treats a minor." In Cardwell, a minor and her parents brought
an action against an osteopath, 45 alleging malpractice, battery,
negligent failure to obtain consent, and failure to obtain informed consent, because the doctor treated Sandra (who was
five months away from her eighteenth birthday) without parental consent." On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged that for well over a century the common law
recognized "that minors achieve varying degrees of maturity
and responsibility (capacity)." 47 However, the court noted that
there was no existing case law which dealt directly with the mature minor exception.48 The court looked to decisions in other
jurisdictions 49 which had held that capacity existed when the
41. See E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 322.
42. 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).
43. Id. at 741.
44. Id. at 745.
45. An osteopath is a doctor who practices a therapeutic system based upon
the "manipulation of the muscles and bones to promote structural integrity." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1371 (2d ed. 1993).
46. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 742. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict on the malpractice issue and sent the remaining issues to
the jury with the instruction that a mature minor did not require parental consent
prior to medical treatment. Id. A general verdict was returned for the defendant.
Id.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the malpractice verdict of
the circuit court but reversed on the battery issue because neither the Tennessee
Legislature nor the Tennessee Supreme Court had adopted the mature minor exception. Id. The court directed a verdict on the battery issue and remanded the
case for a new trial solely on the issue of damages. Id.
47. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 744-45 (citing The Queen v. Smith, 1 Cox C.C.
260 (1845), 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants §§ 9, 45, 142 (1969)).
48. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 747.
49. Id. at 746-47.
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minor had an average person's ability to understand and weigh
the risks and benefits of his or her decision. 50
The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that, while the Tennessee Legislature had not enacted the mature minor exception
to the requirement that parental consent is necessary for the
treatment of minors, it had enacted statutes which "recognize[d] the varying degrees of responsibility and maturity of minors [fourteen] years and older."51 The court examined the
common law rule of capacity, known as "The Rule of Sevens,"
which presumes differing levels of capacity depending on
whether the individual is less than seven years old, between the
52
ages of seven and fourteen, or older than fourteen years.
53
Under the Rule, children under the age of seven lack capacity.

However, a rebuttable presumption of lack of capacity exists for
children between the ages of seven and fourteen, and, furthermore, a rebuttable presumption of capacity exists for children
54
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one.
The court also found that the mature minor exception was
consistent with tort law,55 criminal law56 in Tennessee and

other jurisdictions, and other legal authorities. 57 The court, by
50. Id. at 746 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 115 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON).
51. Id. at 745. The court took notice of the fact that Tennessee had lowered
the age of majority from 21 years to 18 years because the conditions that made 21
the age of majority had eroded with time and "maturity is now reached at earlier
stages of growth than at the time that the common law recognized the age of majority at 21 years." Id. (the court relied on TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105(1) (1994)).
See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-50-311 (1993) (a minor may obtain a learner's permit to
drive at age 15); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-312(e) (a minor may obtain a special
restricted license between the ages of 14 and 16).
52. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 745.

53. Id.
54. Id. (construing State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)).
55. Id. at 748 (construing Walker v. Hamby, 503 S.W.2d 118 (Tenn. 1973);
Bailey v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960), cert. denied (1961)).
56. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748. A minor may be tried as an adult in criminal cases if "the child was sixteen years of age or more at the time of the alleged
conduct, or the child was more than fourteen years of age if such child was charged
with [certain violent crimes]." Id. (the court relied on TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1134(a) (1991); Colley v. State, 169 S.W.2d 848 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 766
(1943); Juvenile Court of Shelby Co. v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 201 S.W. 771
(Tenn. 1918)).
57. The court cited the relative capacity of minors to consent. Cardwell, 724
S.W.2d at 746 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON § 18, at 115 (5th ed. 1984) ("A minor
acquires capacity to consent to different kinds of invasions and conduct at different

9
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noting that it did not find any indication in the Tennessee statutes that the legislature intended to occupy the entire area of
medical treatment for minors, recognized the mature minor exception to the requirement of parental consent. 58 The jury's verdict that Sandra did have the capacity to consent and did
effectively consent to the osteopath's treatment was affirmed. 59
The court, however, cautioned that the "[a]doption of the mature minor exception to the common law rule [was] by no means
a general license to treat minors without parental consent and
[the exception's] application [was] dependent on the facts of
each case." 60
2. Capacity to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment
Just two years after Cardwell, the Illinois Supreme Court
in In re E.G.,61 a case of first impression, recognized the common law right of minors to refuse medical treatment. 62 E.G., a
seventeen year old girl with leukemia, needed life-sustaining
blood transfusions to treat the disease. 63 Both the minor and
her mother were Jehovah's Witnesses, and withheld consent to
64
the blood transfusion due to their religious beliefs.
The trial court found E.G. to be a" 'mature [seventeen] year
old individual,' "65 yet held that the state's interest was greater
stages in his development. Capacity exists when the minor has the ability of the
average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b. (1979) ("[ilf the person consenting is a child ....
the consent may still be effective if he is capable of appreciating the nature, extent
and probable consequences of the conduct consented to, although the consent of a
parent, guardian or other person responsible is not obtained or is expressly
refused.")).
58. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 744. The court stated: "We do not think that the
conclusion that these statutes are intended to abrogate judicial adoption of an exception to the general common law rule requiring parental consent to treat minors
can be supported by the express terms of any of these provisions." Id.
59. Id. at 756.
60. Id. at 745.
61. 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (11M.1989).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 323.
64. Id. Jehovah's Witnesses refuse blood transfusions because they believe
the Bible prohibits "eating blood." John C. Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions By
Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAW. 212 (1964). Receiving a blood transfusion is
deemed to be violative of Leviticus 3:17 which states: "By a perpetual law for your
generation, and all your habitations, neither blood nor fat shall you eat at all." Id.
65. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.
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than the interests of E.G. and her mother.66 A guardian was
appointed to consent to the blood transfusions on E.G.'s behalf.6 7 The minor was then compelled to accept the court-or-

dered transfusions.68 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed in
part and modified in part, and held that E.G. should be "paror
tially emancipated," and had a constitutional right to accept
69
refuse medical treatment based on her religious beliefs.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted the state's petition for
leave to appeal even though E.G. had since reached the age of
majority, stating that the issue presented was not moot because
it was of "substantial public interest."70 The court stated that
the age of majority "is not an impenetrable barrier that magically precludes a minor from possessing and exercising certain
rights normally associated with adulthood." 71 The court held
that mature minors have a common law right to refuse medical
treatment. 72 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on
both statutes and case law in Illinois, and in other jurisdictions,
that recognized the right of minors to consent to medical treat66. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). The trial court noted
that E.G. was just six months from the age of majority, and found her to be mature
and to have independently made the decision to refuse the blood transfusion. Id.
67. Id. at 288.
68. Id. at 291 (McNamara, P.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 291. The appellate court held that the trial court's order "was an
unjustified abridgement of her First Amendment rights" and vacated the trial
court's order. Id. The First Amendment states in relevant part that "Congress
shall make no law . .. prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The court further stated that because the trial court found E.G. "had
made a mature independent decision to follow her religious beliefs, such finding
obviate[d] any state interest in protecting immature minors." E.G., 515 N.E.2d at
290.
70. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 325. Considerations in determining the existence of a
substantial public interest for mootness purposes include "the public or private
nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question." Id. (citing Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill.
1952)(finding the issue on appeal was not moot because of "substantial public interest," even though the minor had received a blood transfusion), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 327-28. In finding this common law right, the court did not address
the constitutional issue of whether the First Amendment's free exercise clause entitles a mature minor to decline medical care. Id. (citing In re Estate of Longeway,
549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); In re Application of Rosewell, 454 N.E.2d 997 (Ill. 1983)
("Constitutional questions should not be considered if a court can decide a case on
other grounds.')). See supra note 69 for the partial text of the First Amendment.

11

434

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:423

ment,73 be declared emancipated, 74 and be treated as adults
under other certain circumstances.7 5 In addition to noting the
statutory exceptions to the requirement of parental consent
found in Illinois, the court relied on the Tennessee Supreme
76
Court's decision in Cardwell v. Bechtol.
The court further concluded that, absent legislative mandate, a trial judge should determine "whether a minor is mature
enough to make health care choices on her own." 77 In doing so,

the trial judge must weigh Illinois' public policy valuing the
sanctity of life and its parens patriae power to protect those who
are not competent to protect themselves against the evidence
presented of the minor's maturity.78 If clear and convincing evidence is presented "that the minor is mature enough to appreciate the consequences of [his or] her actions, and that the minor
is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult, then the
mature minor doctrine affords [the minor] the common law
73. Id. at 326 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 4501-05 (1987) (The Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
410, paras. 210/0.01-210/5 (Smith-Hurd 1993)) (granting minors legal capacity to
consent to medical treatment under specific situations).
74. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 325 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2201-11
(1987) (the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act) (current version at ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 750, paras. 30/1-30/11 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (allowing minors who are at
least 16 years old to be declared emancipated)). The court stated that "when read
together in a complementary fashion, [the Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act and the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act] indicate that the legislature
did not intend that there be an absolute 18-year-old age barrier prohibiting minors
from consenting to medical treatment." Id. at 325-26.
75. Id. at 325 (citing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111, para. 4504 (1987) (current version at ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 410, para. 210/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (enables minors 12
years and older to seek medical attention for venereal diseases or alcohol or drug
treatment); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111, para. 4501 (1987) (current version at ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 410, para. 210/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (enables married or pregnant
minors under the age of 18 to validly consent to medical treatment)).
Additionally, the court looked to the Illinois Criminal Code which states that
juveniles may be prosecuted as adults if the trier of fact finds that the juvenile was
mature enough to have formulated the requisite mental state. Id. (citing ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 32, para. 805-4 (1987) (The Juvenile Court Act)).
Finally, the court recognized that the United States Supreme Court had
adopted the mature minor doctrine in abortion cases allowing women under the
age of 18 to have an abortion without first obtaining parental consent. Id. at 326.
76. Id. at 326-27 (citing Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987)).
For a discussion of Cardwell, see supra notes 42-60.
77. E.g., 549 N.E.2d at 327.
78. Id.
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right to consent to or refuse medical treatment."79 The common
law right is not, however, absolute, as it must be weighed
against the following "four State interests: (1) the preservation
of life; (2) protecting the interests of third parties; (3) prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession."8 0 The court further noted that protecting
the interests of third parties (i.e., parents, guardians, adult siblings, and other relatives) was the most important interest to be
8
balanced against this common law right. '
The following year, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in In
re Swan,8 2 recognized that a minor's clear and convincing decision not to be maintained by life-sustaining procedures must be
respected.83 In Swan, Chad, a minor nine months shy of his
eighteenth birthday, had been in an automobile accident, which
left him in a persistent vegetative state.84 His parents, along
with his older brother, petitioned the court for a declaratory
judgment that the family and others would not be civilly or
criminally liable for their participation in removing the feeding
tubes.8 5 The family's affidavits stated that, prior to the accident, Chad told them "that he [did not] want to be kept alive by
artificial means should [an] injury render him incapable of ex86
isting otherwise."
The Maine Superior Court had appointed a guardian ad litem for Chad, and held an emergency hearing, after Chad's
body rejected the gastronomy tube, in which the court issued a
temporary order directing hydration and medication, but not
79. Id. at 327-28.
80. Id. at 328 (citingLongeway, 549 N.E.2d at 299 (quoting Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977)).
81. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 328. The court stated that "[ilf a parent or guardian
opposes an unemancipated mature minor's refusal to consent to treatment for a
life-threatening health problem, this opposition would weigh heavily against the
minor's right to refuse." Id. The court hypothesized that if E.G.'s mother had not
assented to her daughter's decision to refuse the transfusions, "then the court
would have given serious consideration to her mother's desires." Id. For a discussion of E.G., see Brewster, supra note 33.
82. 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 1203.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1203-04.
86. Id. at 1204.
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nutrition.8 7 Eleven days later, the court entered an order allowing the hydration to be removed if Chad's guardians and attending physician agreed.88 The court stayed its order and
ordered that pending the appeal Chad continue to receive hydration and medication.8 9 Chad's family appealed the decision. 90 On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled that
Chad's desires not to be artificially maintained had been established by clear and convincing evidence. 9 1 This clear and convincing evidence included evidence that Chad had expressed his
desires on two different occasions in the context of serious discussions about people Chad knew who were in persistent vege-

tative states. 92 This finding enabled the court to hold that the

minor's statements were controlling. 93 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court then ordered that Chad's parents, his natural and
legal guardians, be allowed to determine whether or not to rein94
sert the tube.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court decision meant that
Chad, although a minor, would have his desire not to be kept
alive honored. 95 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted: (1)
the evidentiary rule that competent minors could testify as witnesses;9 6 (2) the common law presumption of competency for
87. Swan, 569 A.2d at 1204. The court ordered that the least invasive means
were to be used. Id.
88. Id. at 1204.
89. Id. The guardian ad litem also "urged the court to stay its order." Id. The
guardian ad litem also urged that a feeding tube be inserted "'to preserve the status quo' until the ultimate merits of the case could be decided." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1205.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1206.
94. Id.
95. The appellate decision was compelled by the binding authority of In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987), in which the court held that""when an individual has clearly and convincingly in advance of treatment expressed his decision not
to be maintained by life-sustaining procedures in a persistent vegetative state,
health care professionals must respect that decision.'" Id. at 1204 (citing Gardner,
534 A.2d at 953). The court stated that Gardnercontrolled even though Joseph
Gardner was about 21 years old when he stated he did not want to be maintained
artificially, while Chad was only 16 years old when he first discussed with his
mother "what it meant to be a 'vegetable.'" Id. at 1205.
96. Swan, 569 A.2d at 1205 (citing State v. Hussey, 521 A.2d 278, 280 (Me.
1987) (the minority of a witness is not dispositive regarding the minor's competency to testify)).
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persons fourteen years and older; 97 (3) that persons attain capacity at different ages;98 and (4) the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in In re E.G. 99 The court concluded that "[t]he fact that
Chad made these declarations as to medical treatment before
he reached the age of eighteen [was] at most a factor to be considered by the factfinder in assessing the seriousness and deliberativeness with which his declarations were made." 100 The
court affirmed the superior court's refusal to order reinsertion of
the feeding tube.1 0 1 The court granted Chad's parents the right
to carry out Chad's medical decision not to be artificially
10 2
maintained.
In 1992, two years after the Swan ruling, the Michigan
Court of Appeals in In re Rosebush,10 3 set forth guidelines regarding the right to remove life-sustaining treatment.1°4 Rosebush involved a ten and one-half year old girl who had severed
her spinal cord in a traffic accident and remained in a persistent
vegetative state. 0 5 Her parents sought to have her life-support
system removed.1°6 The circuit court authorized the parents
"'to make any and all decisions regarding the medical treatment received by their daughter, including but not limited to,
97. Id.
98. For a general discussion of a minor's capacity to consent, see PROSSER AND
KEETON § 18, at 115 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b
(1979)). For a discussion of PROSSER AND KEATON and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, see supra note 57. For example, individuals under the age of 18 could consent to adoption, operate a car, purchase tobacco products, leave school, marry,
vote, and purchase and drink alcoholic beverages. Swan, 569 A.2d at 1205.
99. Id. (citing In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (M. 1989)). See supra notes 61-81
and accompanying text.
100. Swan, 569 A.2d at 1205.
101. Id. at 1206. The court's decision was founded on "[the minor's] own conclusions and not on a theory of substituted judgment." Id. The "substituted judgment" standard requires a surrogate to "attempt to reach the decision that the
incapacitated person would make if he or she were able to choose." PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FoREGo LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 132

(1983). This standard "can be used only if a patient was once capable of developing
views relevant to the matter at hand; further, there must be reliable evidence of
those views." Id. at 133.
102. Swan, 569 A.2d at 1206.
103. 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
104. Id. at 639-40.
105. Id. at 634-35.
106. Id. at 635.
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the authority to order the removal of the ventilator that sustained the minor's respiratory functions.' "107 Her parents authorized the removal of the respirator, and the child died
108
shortly thereafter.
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that appellate review
was appropriate despite the child's death "because the issues
involve[d] questions of public significance that may recur and
yet evade review." 10 9 In affirming the circuit court's decision, 110
the Michigan Court of Appeals promulgated guidelines beyond
the instant case,1 ' stating that mature minors have a limited
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment.' 2 The court further stated that the appropriate standard for deciding to terminate life-sustaining treatment of mature minors was the
substituted judgement standard." 3
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 634 (citing Highland Recreation Defense
Found. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 446 N.W.2d 895 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)). The
court also referenced In re Laurance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991) & In re Hamlin,
689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984). Id. at 634.
110. Id. at 641. The court held that Michigan recognized "a right to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment as an aspect of the common-law
doctrine of informed consent." Id. at 635. It therefore found it "unnecessary to
decide the validity of the constitutional or statutory basis in Michigan." Id. at n.1.
The court stated that "the parents' informed decision [was] backed by uncontroverted medical evidence that their young child [was] terminally ill and that her
condition [was] incurable and irreversible, their decision over[rode] any interest of
the state in prolonging their child's life through extraordinary measures." Id. at
637.
The Michigan Supreme Court in In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995),
affirmed the Rosebush Court's reasoning "that a necessary corollary of the common-law right to informed consent is the right not to consent." Id. at 405.
111. Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 641 (Sawyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Sawyer argued that "the majority's pronouncement of guidelines addressing cases beyond the one at bar [was] dangerously close to a
usurpation of powers properly belonging to the Legislature." Id.
112. Id. at 639-40. The court recognized that "[tihe right to refuse lifesaving
medical treatment is not lost because of the incompetence or the youth of the patient." Id. at 636 (citing In re LHR, 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984). The court stated
"[t]he advance directive of a mature minor, stating the desire that life-sustaining
treatment be refused, should be taken into consideration or enforced when deciding whether to terminate the minor's life-support treatment or refuse medical
treatment." Id. at 636, n.4. (citing In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989); In re
Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990)).
113. Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 639. For a discussion of the substituted judgment standard, see supra note 101. The court rejected adopting the "best interests"
and the "clear and convincing" standards. Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 639. The
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C. Rejection of the Mature Minor Doctrine
While there appears to be a trend toward recognizing a
common law right of mature minors to refuse medical treatment, not all courts which have confronted this issue have held
that such a right exists. The Texas Court of Appeals in O.G.,
P.G., and M.G. v. Baum, 114 did not find In re E.G.115 persuasive
and declined to subscribe to the mature minor doctrine.11 6 In
O.G., doctors advised a sixteen year old minor who was struck
by a train that a blood transfusion would be needed during surgery.117 The minor, a Jehovah's Witness, 118 withheld consent to
a transfusion and signed a form releasing the hospital and the
doctor

"

'from all liability or responsibility ... for following [his]

request."'119 The boy's parents also refused to consent to a
transfusion if it was needed during surgery. 120 The Harris
County Child Protective Services (hereinafter CPS) was appointed the boy's temporary managing conservator.' 21
The district court heard testimony from a CPS caseworker
and the boy's father that the boy understood his refusal could be
fatal. 122 On appeal, the parents argued that the judge's appointment of a conservator deprived them of their constitucourt noted that the best interests standard was inappropriate with regard to advance directives of mature minors because it is used "where the patient has never
been competent." Id. Additionally, the court "summarily reject[ed] [the clear and
convincing] standard, because its adoption would always preclude the termination
of life-support efforts for minors . . . who have never been legally competent, in
direct contradiction of the right to refuse medical treatment." Id. at n.7.
Three years after Rosebush, the Michigan Supreme Court held that where one
"was competent and able to express his wishes and desires," a subjective decisionmaking standard [which is based on a patient's right to self determination] should
be used. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 408. The Martin Court further stated that it
"express[ed] no opinion about the proper decision-making standard for patients
who [had] never been competent." Id. at 409, n.15. It did, however, state that a
more objective test, (which is based on the state's parens patriae power), may be
"necessary and appropriate" under the circumstances presented in Rosebush. Id.
at 408-09.
114. 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
115. 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
116. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 842.
117. Id. at 840.
118. For a discussion of the tenets of this religion, see supra note 64.
119. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 840.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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tional right to freely exercise their religion and their authority
123
to refuse a blood transfusion for their son.
The boy, relying on In re E.G., 12 maintained that he had a
constitutional 125 and common law right 126 to refuse the transfusion.127 The court, however, distinguished In re E.G. from the
case at hand thereby reducing its persuasive authority in
0. G. 128 The court noted that the Illinois decision addressed only
Illinois common law and did not address the First Amendment
issue. 129 Additionally, it did not address federal constitutional
law or Texas constitutional and common law. 30 Lastly, the
court stated that Texas had not adopted the mature minor
3
standard.1 '
The court then factually distinguished In re E.G. 32 The
court noted that E.G.'s doctors and the associate general counsel for the University of Chicago Hospital all testified to E.G.'s
maturity.13 In O.G., however, only the minor's father had testified that his son understood that his refusal of a transfusion
123. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 840. The Texas Court of Appeals, affirming the district court, concluded that the parents' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
did not "include the liberty to expose their child to ill health or death." Id. at 840
(citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)). The court further
stated that "federal authority has refused to recognize parental constitutional
rights to refuse blood transfusions for their minor children when a court appoints a
guardian with the authority to consent to a transfusion over the parents' objections." Id. at 841 (citing Staelens v. Yake, 432 F. Supp. 834, 839 (N.D. IMI.1977)).
124. 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989); See supra notes 61-81.
125. The minor stated he had a First Amendment right to freely exercise his
religion. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 841-42. See supra note 69 for the partial text of the
First Amendment.
126. Mature minors in Illinois had a common law right to refuse medical
treatment. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 842.
127. Id.
128. Id. For a discussion of In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (InI. 1989), see supra
notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
129. Id. See E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 328 (stating that "[blecause [the court found]
that a mature minor may exercise a common law right to consent to or refuse medical care, [the court] decline[d] to address the [First Amendment free exercise
clause] issue.").
130. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 842.
131. Id.
132. Id. For a discussion of In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989), see supra
notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
133. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 842. The court discussed that E.G.'s doctors testified
that she was "competent to understand the consequences of accepting or rejecting
treatment" and a psychiatrist testified that E.G. had "the maturity level... of an
18 to 21 year old and that she [was] competent to make an informed decision to
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could be fatal. 13 4 Additionally, the court mentioned that,
although E.G. had testified before the trial court demonstrating
her competence to understand the consequences of refusing
treatment, 3 5 here, the minor had not testified before the trial
court. 136 The Texas Court of Appeals concluded that, because

Texas and federal law were not settled as to whether a sixteen
year old had a constitutional right to refuse a blood transfusion,
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in appointing CPS
as temporary managing conservator. 3 7 The court did not reach
the issues of whether a minor has a right under the United
States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, or the common law
to refuse blood transfusions, because the relators 38 did not cite
any cases holding that such a right existed. 39
D. Responses of the Non-Legal Community
The debate over the right of mature minors to refuse lifesupporting treatment continues and has been further fueled by
the recent policy statements of the American Academy of Pediatrics' 4° and the Midwest Bioethics Center of Kansas City, Missouri 4 '

(hereinafter Center) that "[support] the right of

refuse [a] blood transfusion, even if this choice was fatal." Id. (citing In re E.G.,
549 N.E.2d 322, 324 (11. 1989)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Relator is defined as "[a]n informer. The person upon whose complaint,
or at whose instance certain writs are issued. . . , and who is quasi the plaintiff in
the proceeding.... A party in interest who is permitted to institute a proceeding
in the name of the People or the Attorney General when the right to sue resides
solely in that official." (alteration in original) BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1289 (6th
ed. 1990).
139. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 842.
140. Kathryn Dore Perkins, Kids Asserting Rights in Health Care. Support
Grows for Choice in Treatment, S.F. EXAMINER, May 1, 1995, at B10 [hereinafter
Perkins]. The American Pediatrics Academy (hereinafter Academy), after wrestling with the issue for 10 years, published its statement in February 1995. Id.
The Academy concluded that "[platients generally have a moral and legal right to
refuse proposed medical intervention, except when the patient has diminished decision-making capacity." Id. Dr. William Bartholome was the "primary author
and champion" of the academy's policy and "was the force behind an effort by [the
Midwest Bioethics Center of Kansas City, Missouri's] ... weighty statement...
supporting children's rights." Id.
141. Id. The Midwest Bioethics Center explained its statement at a discussion group on May 23, 1995. MIDWEsT BIOETHICS CENTER, MAJOR DECISIONS AND
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competent youngsters to refuse or consent to life-sustaining
treatment."14 2 The Center stated it was "committed to the pursuit of a shared decision making model which respects the important and distinct roles of children, parents, and providers in
43
health care decisions."'
The Center's model was based on the following instrumental assumptions: 44 (1) a person's age was not necessarily determinative of decision-making capacity; 45 (2) children are not the
parents' property; 46 (3) minors have moral status and legal
standing independent of their parents; 47 (4) mature minors
should be governed by the ethical and legal presumptions of capacity. 148 In addition, the Center recognized "the developing capacity of minors for rationality, autonomy, and participation in
decision-making . . -149 and set forth three primary components for its "new model for health care decision making involving minors." 50 The first component of the Center's model was
"child assent."15' The Center proposed that health care providers solicit the assent of children "who are capable of participatMINORS: HEALTH CARE TREATMENT DECISION MAKING FOR CHILDREN (1995). The

Center's Task Force was comprised of "pediatricians, nurses, social workers, child
psychologists, child psychiatrists, chaplains, and patient representatives" along
with "clinical ethicists, health care lawyers, risk managers, community representatives and staff from Midwest Bioethics Center." MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER,
supra note 18, at § 1.0.
142. Perkins, supra note 140. Bartholome provided a general overview of the
statements: "[Ihf a person is 15, 16, or 17 and knows what is wrong with them and
understands the options, risks and benefits of treatment, they would have the
same right of refusal an adult would have." Perkins, supra note 140.
143. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 1.0 (emphasis in the
original).
144. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 4.0.
145. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 4.2.
146. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 4.5.
147. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 4.6.
148. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 4.12.
149. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 1.0. Minors were assumed to fit into three categories for purposes of the guideline: (1) minors who do
not have decision-making capacity (e.g., infants, toddlers, most pre-school aged
children); (2) minors who have a developing decision-making capacity (e.g., elementary school aged children); and (3) minors who have decision-making capacity
to make most medical care decisions (e.g., mature minors, emancipated minors and
most senior high school aged minors). MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18,
at § 1.0.
150. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 1.0.
151. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 1.0. Child assent is "the
free expression of a child's willingness to undergo a specific health care treatment
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ing in the treatment decision-making but have not yet fully
developed decisional capacity." 152 The Center's second component recognized the ethical obligations of health care providers
to minor patients and included the concept of informed parental/guardian permission. 153 Parental/Guardian permission and
the assent of the children must be received in order for health
care providers to treat children with developing capacities for
decision-making. 5 4 The final component acknowledged the assumption that "minors achieve decisional capacity at [a] much
earlier [age] than is recognized legally."' 5 5
The determination of the minor's decisional capacity would
be shared by the minor, the parents, and the health care providers. 56 Decisional capacity would be assessed on a case-by-case
basis. 57 The minor's desires with respect to treatment alternatives would not be used as evidence of the minor's decisional
capacity. 58 If, however, the minor wanted to refuse medical
treatment, the assessment of the minor's decisional capacity
would "require greater confidence about the minor's decisional
159
capacity on the part of providers and parents."
The Center developed separate Patient Rights Statements
for each of the three categories of minors.' 60 The Patient Rights
Statement drafted for minors with decisional capacity included
the right to refuse medical treatment.' 6' Minors with decisional
based on the child's knowledge and understanding." MIDWEST BIOETHICS
supra note 18, at § 1.0.

CENTER,

152. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 1.0.
153. MIDWEST BIOETHics CENTER, supra note 18, at § 1.0. Informed parental

permission was defined as "a process by which parents/guardians of minors grant
or deny permission to the provision of recommended health care interventions for
their children or wards." MIDWEST BIOErhICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 2.13.
154. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 2.13.
155. MIDWEST BIoETmcS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 1.0.
156. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 7.4.
157. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 7.4.a.
158. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 7.4.a.
159. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 7.4.e.
160. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 6.0. For a discussion of
the three categories of minors, see supra note 149.
161. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 6.2.i. The statement delineates the right of minors to "[ajcept or refuse any procedure, drug or treatment
and to be informed of the possible consequences of any such decision." MIDWEST
BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 6.2.i.
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capacity were "regarded as having the right to refuse treat-

ment, including life-sustaining treatment ....')162
Parents of said minors were regarded as "'consultants'
[whose role should include] assist[ing] the minor to make appro163
priate decisions by providing information and support .... .
The Center set forth a parental statement "to complement the
1
patients' rights statements provided to their child." '
Recognizing that disagreements transpire among parents
and their children over treatment decisions, the Center included two provisions in the parental statement setting forth
mechanisms to resolve the conflict. 16 5 Mechanisms to resolve
the disagreement ranged from talking to another health care
provider, to requesting help from the hospital's ethics committee.1 6 6 In case the disagreement was not resolved, the parents
would have the right to transfer their child to another medical
institution, and if the health care providers opposed transfer,
the health care institution would provide the parents with notice of a pending legal action and give the parents information
67
to help them obtain legal counsel.
The Center acknowledged that its guidelines would not be
68
accepted into the policies of medical institutions at face value.
Therefore, the Center stated that it hoped the guidelines
"help[ed] to identify the issues and [had] provided some
69
thoughtful guidance to those who work with minors."
III.
A.

Minors in New York

Current Statutory and Common Law Treatment of Minors

In New York, competent adults have a common law 7 0 and a
statutory right to bodily self-determination to accept and to re§ 7.3.a.
§ 7.3.b.
§ 6.3.
165. MIDWEST BIoETHIcs CENTER, supra note 18, at §§ 6.3.i & 6.3.j.
166. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 6.3.i.
167. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 6.3.j.
168. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 8.0.
169. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at § 8.0.
170. See In re Storar (In re Eichner), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (the right to decide about medical treatment includes the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) ("every human
MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at
MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 18, at
164. MIDWEST BioETHics CENTER, supra note 18, at

162.
163.
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fuse medical treatment. 171 Adults also have a right guaranteed
by the New York State Constitution to refuse life-preserving
treatment. 172 However, the right to refuse medical treatment is
not absolute; certain compelling state interests, such as prevention of suicide or protection of a minor or other dependents, may
act as a barrier to granting a competent patient's application to
73
refuse extraordinary treatment.
Minors, on the other hand, are for the most part considered
incompetent. 74 As such, parental consent is ordinarily required
before the minor can receive health services. 75 The right of
being of adult years and sound mind has the right, at common law, to determine
what shall be done with his own body ..
and cannot be subjected to medical
treatment without his consent.").
171. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c(2) and (3)(e) (McKinney 1993) (providing that "every nursing home and facility providing health related service...
shall adopt and make public a statement of rights and responsibilities of patients"
stating that "[elvery patient shall have the right to receive adequate and appropriate medical care, to be fully informed of his or her medical condition and proposed
treatment unless medically contraindicated, and to refuse medication and treatment after being fully informed of and understanding the consequences of such
actions."). Id. at § 2803-c(3)(e).
172. N.Y. CONST. art. I. See also Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 226, 551
N.E.2d 77, 81, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876, 880 (1990) (The " ' fundamental common-law right
[of a competent adult to refuse life-preserving treatment] is coextensive with the
patient's liberty interest protected by the due process clause of (the New York]
State Constitution' ")(quoting Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 493, 495 N.E.2d 337,
341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (1986)).
173. See Fosmire, 75 N.Y.2d at 227, 551 N.E.2d at 81, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 880
(1990) (The threshold inquiry is whether there is an identifiable State interest in
intervening in the patient's medical choice. The state has a well-recognized interest in protecting and preserving the lives of its citizens."); In re Lydia E. Hall
Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477, 486, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 711 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1982) (directed that life support be removed from a terminally ill 41 year old unmarried and childless man who, prior to becoming comatose, made an informed,
rational and knowing decision to forego such treatments).
The decision to refuse essential medical care is not considered a suicidal act
nor is it an indication of incompetence. Fosmire, 75 N.Y.2d at 227, 551 N.E.2d at
82, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 881 (citing In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 377-78 n.6, 420 N.E.2d at
71 n.6, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273 n.6 (1981)).
174. See In re Alfonso v. Fernandez, 195 A.D.2d 46, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d
Dep't 1993), appeal dismissed, 83 N.Y.2d 906, 637 N.E.2d 278, 614 N.Y.S.2d 388
(1994); Weber v. New York, 267 A.D. 325, 45 N.Y.S.2d 834 (3d Dep't 1944); Locklin
v. Fisher, 264 A.D. 452, 36 N.Y.S.2d 162 (3d Dep't), reh'g and appeal denied, 264
A.D. 961, 37 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1942). For a discussion of Alfonso, see infra note 175.
175. See In re Alfonso 195 A.D.2d 46, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1993), appeal
dismissed, 83 N.Y.2d 906, 637 N.E.2d 278, 614 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1994). "Health services" is not defined in the New York Public Health Law or in the common law. Id.
at 63, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 270 (Eiber J., dissenting).
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parents to speak for their children with regard to medical treatment is not absolute. 176 In addition, several exceptions to the
general rule requiring parental consent have been codified in
the New York Public Health Law; 1 77 "[tihe exceptions recognize
that sound public policy is served by allowing adolescents
younger than [eighteen] to control their own health care under
certain circumstances." 178 The New York Court of Appeals has
yet to address the issue of allowing mature minors to refuse lifeIn Alfonso, parents of high school students challenged the New York City
Board of Education's decision to include a condom distribution program in its HIV/
AIDS education program. Id. at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261. The parents contended
that the condom distribution program was violative of § 2504 of the New York Public Health Law. Specifically, they argued that the condom availability program
was a "health service," and, therefore, the school required parental consent before
providing the program. Id. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney 1985).
The parents also argued that the program violated not only their due process
rights to direct the upbringing of their children, but also the right to free exercise
of religion under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
New York Constitution. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 49, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 261. See N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 3, and supra note 69 for the partial text of the First Amendment.
The appellate division held that the distribution of condoms was a "health service," and as such required parental consent. Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 51-52, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 263. The court reasoned that the public health law had codified some,
but not all, common law exceptions to the general incapacity of minors rule, and
none were applicable in the case at bar. Id. at 51, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
176. See In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1979) (court appointed guardian to consent to surgery for child with spina
bifida where the parents refused to consent); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. Ulster County 1970) aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d
253 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972)
(court ordered surgery to correct severe facial deformity of 15 year old boy, and
held that mother's objection on religious grounds to blood transfusion, in connection with surgery, constituted neglect).
177. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1) (McKinney 1985) ("Any person who
is 18 years of age or older, or is the parent of a child or has married, may give
effective consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services for himself or
herself, and the consent of no other person shall be necessary."); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2504(3) (McKinney 1985) ("Any person who is pregnant may give effective
consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services relating to prenatal
care."); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(4) (McKinney 1985) (Allowing medical, dental, health and hospital services to be given "when, in the physician's judgment an
emergency exists and the person is in immediate need of medical attention and an
attempt to secure consent would result in delay of treatment which would increase
the risk to the person's life or health."). See also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2980(3)
(McKinney 1991) (defining "capacity to make health care decisions" as "the ability
to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of health care decisions, including the benefits and risks of and alternatives to any proposed health
care, and to reach an informed decision.").
178. NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 42.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss2/13

24

1996]

MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE

447

sustaining medical treatment, 179 and the New York Legislature
has yet to enact such a law, despite the introduction of such
bills during the last several legislative sessions. 180
B.

The Lower New York Courts

The same year that the Illinois Supreme Court recognized
the mature minor doctrine, a New York trial court in In re Long
Island Jewish Medical Center'8 1 recognized the merit in the
"mature minor" doctrine. One month before his eighteenth
birthday, Phillip Malcolm, was rushed to the plaintiff hospital's
emergency room. Preliminary blood tests indicated his blood
was being broken down 8 2 and that he might need a blood transfusion. 83 Phillip and his parents withheld their consent to the

needed blood transfusions because they were Jehovah's
Witnesses.184
The next morning, the hospital petitioned the court for an
order authorizing the medical treatment.8 5 During the hearing
held that afternoon, the doctors announced that Phillip was suffering from widespread pediatric cancer, 8 6 and that the recommended course of treatment, chemotherapy, would require that
Phillip have transfusions. 187 Phillip and his parents immedi179. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 44. As a result, lower
New York courts have not been consistent when addressing the rights of minors to
refuse life-sustaining treatment. Compare In re Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr.,
147 Misc. 2d 724, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. Queen's County 1990) (calling for the
adoption of the mature minor doctrine) with In re Thomas B., 152 Misc. 2d 96, 574
N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fain. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1991) (implicitly rejecting the mature
minor doctrine).
180. See N.Y.A. 6791, 218th Sess. (1995) and N.Y.S. 5020, 218th Sess. (1995).
For a discussion of these bills see infra notes 231-34.
181. 147 Misc. 2d 724, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1990).
182. Id. at 725, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 240. Phillip's blood count revealed that he
was anemic and that his hemoglobin and hematocrit counts were abnormally low.
Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. For a discussion of the tenets of this religion, see supra note 64.
185. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 147 Misc. 2d at 725, 557 N.Y.S.2d at
240.
186. Id. at 725, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 240-41.
187. Id. at 725, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 241. A doctor testified that 75% of patients
respond to this treatment and go into remission from several months to years. The
cure rate among those patients who go into remission was between 25% and 30%.
Id.
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ately refused to consent to the transfusions.1 8 8 Since this was

the first time that Phillip and his parents had learned of the
diagnosis, the court asked them to reconsider their refusal.8 9
The next day, the doctor in charge of Phillip's case testified
that, without treatment, Phillip would die a painful death,
probably within a month. 90 Again, Phillip's parents refused to
consent to the transfusions.'i9 Phillip testified that he joined
the Jehovah's Witnesses in 1987, then lost interest for a while
until he returned to the religion in 1989.192 Phillip stated that
although he did not know the books of the Bible, he knew that
the religion prohibited blood transfusions. 93 The court noted
that Phillip had never been away from home, never dated a girl,
always consulted his parents before making decisions, and
when asked whether he considered himself an adult or a child,
responded "child." 94 Ultimately, after Phillip's condition worsened, the court ordered an immediate transfusion.'9 5
The court, noting statutory instances permitting minors to
consent to medical treatment, 96 held that Phillip was not a mature minor and "his refusal to consent to blood transfusions
188. Id. at 726, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
189. Id.
190. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 147 Misc. 2d 724, 726, 557 N.Y.S.2d
239, 240 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1990).
191. Id. at 727, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
192. Id.
193. Id. The books of the Bible are an important part of the study of Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. Phillip believed he would not achieve everlasting life if he
consented to the transfusion. Id. at 727, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42. He further
stated that if the court ordered the transfusions "it would not be his responsibility
or sin." Id. at 727, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
194. Id. at 727, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
195. Id. at 728, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
196. Id. at 729-30, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 242. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.13(a)
(McKinney 1988) (permitting minors over the age of 16 to consent to inpatient
mental health treatment); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw §§ 33.21(c)-(d) (McKinney 1988)
(permitting minors to consent to outpatient mental treatment); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAw § 21.11(c) (McKinney 1988) (permitting minors to consent to substance abuse
treatment); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2305(2) (McKinney 1985) (permitting minors
to consent to treatment for sexually transmitted diseases); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2504(1) (McKinney 1985) (permitting any married person or parent to give effective consent for his or her own medical, dental, health and hospital services); N.Y.
PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(2) (McKinney 1985) (permitting any parent to give effective consent for his or her child); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(3) (McKinney
1985) (permitting any pregnant female to give effective consent relating to prenatal care).
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[was] not based upon a mature understanding of his own religious beliefs or of the fatal consequences to himself."197 Finally,
the court "recommended that the Legislature or the appellate
courts take a hard look at the 'mature minor' doctrine and make
it either statutory or decisional law in New York State." 98
The following year, a New York family court in In re
Thomas B.199 judicially overrode the protests of a fifteen year
old who refused to undergo a tumor biopsy due to his "strong
phobia for needles." 200 The boy's mother had petitioned the
court for an order requiring her child to submit to the surgery. 201 The boy's legal guardian expressed Thomas' objections,
yet agreed that the surgery was consistent with the minor's best
interests.202

Recognizing the New York State's interest in protecting the
health and welfare of children within its jurisdiction, 2 3 the
court declared that a person under the legal age of majority
20 4
could neither consent to treatment nor withhold consent.
Although the court expressed its reluctance to summarily disregard Thomas' protests, it nevertheless ordered the hospital to
20 5
immediately admit, examine, and surgically treat him.

197. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 147 Misc. 2d at 730, 557 N.Y.S.2d at
243.
198. Id. at 730, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243. The court strongly recommended that if
the mature minor doctrine did become law in New York, a hearing should be held
to determine first whether the child is mature. Id. The court further stated that if
the minor was not found to be mature, the hearing should continue without the
child present. Id. at 730, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243, n.16.
199. 152 Misc. 2d 96, 574 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fam. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1991).
200. Id. at 97, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
201. Id. at 97, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 98, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 660. "The State, 'as parens patriae, has a
strong interest' in protecting the health and welfare of [a] child (within its jurisdiction)." Id. (citing In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 381, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981)).
204. Thomas B., 152 Misc. 2d at 98-99, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61. See N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2504(1) (McKinney 1985). The court concluded that "[a]n implicit
corollary of [section 2504(a) of the New York Public Health Law] is that a person
under eighteen years of age may not give effective consent... it follows logically
that such a person may not effectively withhold consent, either." Thomas B., 152
Misc. 2d at 98-99, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61.
205. Thomas B., 152 Misc. 2d at 98-99, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61. The court
found that the mother and the Department of Social Services had met their burden
of demonstrating that "time [was] of the essence." Id. at 99, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
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C. The Governor's Task Force on Life and the Law
a
In 1985, New York State Governor Cuomo established
20 6
Task Force on Life and the Law (hereinafter Task Force) to
enhance the public's understanding of issues raised by medical
advances, including decisions about life-sustaining treatment,
and to recommend legislation or regulation. 20 7 The twenty-five
member Task Force included prominent physicians, nurses, attorneys, academics and representatives of religious
208
communities.
206. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at vii. The Task Force was
convened as a result of the former state health commissioner Dr. David Axelrod's
extraordinary activism. Jonathan D. Moreno, Who's to Choose? Surrogate Decisionmaking in New York State, 23 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5 (1993).
Even though Governor Cuomo lost his reelection bid in November 1994, the
Task Force's funding has been guaranteed through the end of March 1996. Telephone Interview with Carl H. Coleman, Associate Counsel to the New York Task
Force on Life and the Law (June 27, 1995).
207. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at vii. For a general summary of the Task Force's proposal on surrogate decision-making, see John J. Regan, Refusing Life-Sustaining Treatment for Incompetent Patients: New York's
Response to Cruzan, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 341 (1991-1992).
208. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at ii-iii. Task Force members included: Karl Adler, M.D. (Dean, New York Medical College); Rev. Msgr.
John A. Alesandro (Chancellor, Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre); John
Arras, Ph.D. (Clinical Associate Professor of Bioethics, Albert Einstein College of
Medicine/Monefiore Medical Center); Mario L. Baeza, Esq. (Debevoise &
Plimpton); The Right Rev. David Ball (Bishop, Episcopal Diocese of Albany); Rabbi
J. David Bleich (Professor of Talmud, Yeshiva University; Professor of Jewish Law
and Ethics, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law); Evan Calkins, M.D. (Professor of
Medicine at Emeritus, SUNY-Buffalo); Richard J. Concannon, Esq. (Kelley, Drye &
Warren); Myron W. Conovitz, M.D. (Attending Physician, North Shore University
Hospital; Clinical Associate Professor of Medicine, Cornell University Medical College); Saul J. Farber (Dean and Provost, Chairman, Department of Medicine, New
York University School of Medicine); Alan R. Fleischman, M.D. (Director, Division
of Neonatology, Albert Einstein College of Medicine/Montefiore Medical Center);
Samuel Gorovitz, Ph.D. (Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, Professor of Philosophy, Syracuse University); Jane Greenlaw, J.D., R.N. (Director, Division of the
Medical Humanities, University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry);
Beatrix A. Hamburg, M.D. (Chairman, Division of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Mount Sinai School of Medicine); Denise Hanlon, R.N., M.S. (Clinical Specialist, Rehabilitation and Gerontology); Rev. Donald W. McKinney (First Unitarian
Church of Brooklyn, Chairman Emeritus, Choice in Dying); Maria I. New, M.D.
(Chief, Department of Pediatrics, New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center);
John J. Regan, J.S.D. (Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law); Rabbi
A. James Rudin (National Director of Interreligious Affairs, The American Jewish
Committee); Rev. Betty Bone Schiess (Episcopal Diocese of Central New York);
Barbara Shack (The New York Civil Liberties Union); Rev. Robert S. Smith (Director, Institute for Medicine in Contemporary Society, SUNY Health Science Center
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1. Health Care Decisions of Mature Minors
In addressing the right of mature minors to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the Task Force recognized the "complex balancing of the developing rights of the minor and parental
rights,"209 and society's interest "in promoting the autonomy
and well-being of minors." 210 The Task Force rejected the idea
of lowering the age of majority for deciding health care issues,
noting that minors are currently accorded the right to decide
about medical treatment for certain conditions only. 211 Additionally, it refused to extend to minors the presumption of capacity accorded to adults. 21 2 It did, however, recognize that
some minors have the maturity and capacity to participate in
decisions about their life-sustaining treatment. 213 The Task
Force recommended that mature minors be accorded a substantial, and not an exclusive, role in decisions about life-sustaining
at Stony Brook); and Elizabeth W. Stack (Commissioner, New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled). NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE,
supra note 19, at ii, iii.
All the members supported the proposed legislation except Rabbi J. David
Bleich. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at ix. Rabbi Bleich's Minority Report primarily centered on his belief that "there has been a steady, linear
progression in the erosion of the value associated with preservation of human life

in the mores of our society."

NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE,

supra note 19, at 240.

Drawing a distinction between a surrogate's role in choosing among alternative
therapies (the goal of which is to prolong life) and in withholding potentially lifeprolonging treatment (the goal of which is the patient's early demise), Rabbi Bleich
concluded that the "decision to die is far too awesome a matter to be delegated to a
proxy and certainly far too awesome a matter to be delegated to a self-appointed
surrogate." NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 243.
209. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 129.
210. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 129.
211. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 129-30.
212. NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 130. The Task Force
found that extending such presumption would be inappropriate because regardless
of whether the minor has significant cognitive abilities, the adolescent "may have
difficulty in assessing future consequences of [his or her] choices or anticipating
changes in [his or her] values or preferences." NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE,
supra note 19, at 130.
But see Nancy Batterman, Under Age: A Minor's Right to Consent to Health
Care, 10 TouRo L. REv. 637 (1994). Batterman contends that "[b]y codifying the
'mature minor' doctrine, [the New York legislature] would ...be harmonizing the
law with what is already current practice." Id. at 673. She describes § 2504 of the
New York Public Health Law as a "piecemeal statutory approach to minors' health
care issues." Id. at 669. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1), (3), (4) (McKinney
1985).
213. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 130.
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treatment. 214 It chose to give mature minors this non-exclusive
role even though it recognized that in certain cases it would be
"ethically acceptable and appropriate to respect the choice of a
capable unemancipated minor."215 The Task Force "recommend[ed] that the determination of a minor's capacity to partreatment should be
ticipate in a decision about life-sustaining
216
made on a case-by-case basis."
Determinations of capacity would be made by the attending
217
physician, in consultation with the parent(s) or guardian(s).
The physician would assess the minor's maturity, conceptual
218 If
ability and experience in making important life decisions.
214. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131.
215. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131. For example, the

Task Force mentioned that an adolescent dying of AIDS or cancer might be able to
accept death more readily than his or her parents, and a course of treatment (i.e.,
chemotherapy or experimental treatment for AIDS) may only prolong the adolescent's dying. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131. The Task Force
quickly dismissed a proposal to respect the choice of minors in the above scenario
basing its rejection on its belief that "few hospitals would remove treatment in the
face of parental opposition and that granting minors the right to decide over the
objection of parents [would] also yield poor decisions in some cases." NEW YORK
STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131.
216. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 130.
217. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131. The Task Force

believed that parents would be most familiar with their child's emotional and cognitive development. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131. Compare the Task Force's proposal that ultimately the attending physician would
determine capacity based on observations of the minor and information received by
the parents and health care professionals. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra

note 19, at 131 with N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2963(2), (3)(a) (McKinney 1993)
(requiring at least 2 physicians concur in the determination that an adult lacks
capacity to make a decision regarding cardiopulmonary resuscitation) and N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2983(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (requiring for a decision to
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment that the attending physician who
determines that a patient lacks capacity, for the purpose of empowering a health
care agent, because of mental illness to consult with a qualified psychiatrist) and
N.Y. PUB.HEALTH LAW § 2983(1)(c) (McKinney 1993) (requiring for a decision to
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment that the attending physician who
determines that a patient lacks capacity, for the purpose of empowering a health
care agent, because of a developmental disability to consult with a specific physician or clinical psychologist).
218. NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 130. See Parham, 422

U.S. 584, 608 (1979). The Parham Court stated that "[w]hat is best for a child is
an individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in
each case" and that "[there is no reason to require a judicial-type hearing in all
ciricumstances." Id. The Court further noted that it did "not accept the notion that
the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision from
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the attending physician found the minor had decisional capacity, the minor would then be accorded a substantial, although
not exclusive, role in decisions to refuse life-sustaining treatment.219 Parental consent would be required in order for the
minor to forego life-sustaining treatment, unless the minor obtained a court order. 220 Although the Task Force believed that
disagreements about life-sustaining treatment between minors
with decision-making capacity and their parents would be
rare, 221 it suggested that if such a conflict arose, a bioethics review committee could play a role in contributing to the
resolution. 222
2. The Role of Bioethics Review Committees
The Task Force proposed that state law mandate the creation of bioethics review committees 22 in each health care facility in the state. These review committees would consider
treatment decisions an on individual basis, as opposed to an institutional basis, which would examine whole research programs. 224 Each bioethics review committee would include at
least one physician; one registered nurse; one certified social
worker or other person with training or expertise in providing
psychosocial services to patients; one individual with training
or expertise in either bioethics, moral philosophy, or theology;
225
and one lay community member unaffiliated with the facility.
The Task Force recommended that the bioethics review
committees be available to consult and advise persons who are
engaged in conflict regarding the care of patients. 226 These coma trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an untrained
judge .... " Id. at 609.
219. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131.
220. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131. Parental consent
would not, however, be required if the minor chose to have the treatment. NEW
YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131.
221. NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131.
222. NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 131-32.
223. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 137-38. Bioethics is defined as "the study of the ethical problems arising from scientific advances" in the
fields of biology and medicine. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 140 (3d ed.
1988). See Barbara C. Thorton et al., Bioethics Education - Expanding the Circleof
Participants,23 HASTINGS CETER REPORT 25 (Jan.-Feb. 1993).
224. NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 138.
225. NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 139.
226. NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 148.
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mittees would, through informal mediation, have a role in helping to resolve conflicts between minors who refuse life227
sustaining treatment, and their parents.
In the event conflicts were not resolved, the Task Force suggested that the committees issue non-binding opinions stating
their conclusions. 228 The Task Force believed that the use of
non-binding opinions to support the minor's decision to refuse
life-sustaining treatment would help convince the parents to
consent to the mature minor's decision. 229 "In the unusual
event" that the parents continued to insist on treatment despite
the minor's decision, the Task Force stated that the committee
or health care facility should then refer the matter to the Legal
Aid Society, or help the minor obtain other legal counsel so that
a court could resolve the ongoing conflict. 230
The Task Force recommendations and proposed legislation
led Assemblyman Gottfried to again sponsor and introduce a
bill to amend the New York Public Health Law. 231 This bill, in
addition to the Senate Bill introduced by Senator Hannon, 232 set

forth the Task Force recommendations with respect to the determination of a minor's decision-making capacity, and the limited role minors with said capacity would have with regard to

227. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 132.
228. NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 132.
229. NEW YoRK STATE TAK FORCE, supra note 19, at 132.
230. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 132.
231. N.Y.A. 6791, 218th Sess. (1995). Prior to the introduction of this bill,
Assemblyman Gottfried, at the request of Governor Cuomo, sponsored and introduced bills to amend the New York Public Health Law which did not pass the
Assembly. See, e.g., N.Y.A. 7166-B, N.Y. Legis, 215th Sess. (1993).
232. N.Y.S. 5020, 218th Sess. (1995).
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withholding life-sustaining treatment. 2 3 Neither bill passed
234
during the first session of the legislature.
III. Analysis
The New York Legislature needs to decide the issue of
whether mature minors should have the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Currently, minors in New York do not have
a statutory, a common law, or a recognized constitutional right
to participate in decisions regarding refusal of life-sustaining
medical treatment. Minors who are deemed mature despite
their chronological age should know definitively what weight, if
any, will be given to their desire to refuse medical treatment.
It is well established that children's decision-making capacity increases with age,23 5 and that the such capacity is best as23 6
sessed on a case-by-case basis that recognizes individualism.
New York law must similarly recognize the progressive capacity
of minors and the liberty interest minors have with respect to
health care decisions,23 7 and grant mature minors the right to
refuse medical treatment.
The mature minor exception to the general rule that parents speak for their children with regard to health care decisions is not part of New York's common law.m Because "[tihe
courts can only decide the cases that actually come before
233. Decision-making capacity is defined as "the ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of proposed health care, including the benefits and risks of, and alternatives to, any such proposed health care, and to reach
and informed decision." N.YA. 6791 § 2995-A(7), 218th Sess. (1995); N.Y.S. 5020
§ 2995-A(7), 218th Sess. (1995). In determining whether the minor has decisionmaking capacity:
[an attending physician, in consultation with a minor's parent or guardian
shall determine whether a minor has decision-making capacity for a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. If the minor has
such capacity, the parent must consent to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment for decisions pursuant to this section.
N.Y.A. 6791 § 2995-E(2)(A), 218th Sess. (1995); N.Y.S. 5020 § 2995-E(2)(A), 218th
Sess. (1995).
234. Search of WESTLAW, NY-BILLTRK Database (July 28, 1995).
235. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 57.
236. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 130.
237. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
238. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 44.
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them,"239 the New York Court of Appeals has not yet addressed
the issue of whether mature minors have a common law right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Should the court be
faced with the issue, absent prior legislative action, it would
have to examine whether the New York Public Health Law exceptions to the general rule of parental consent 240 are indicative
of the legislature's intent to occupy the entire area of medical
treatment for minors. 241
A.

The Role of the Legislature

The New York Legislature, and not the judiciary, is the
proper body to ultimately establish the mature minor doctrine
in New York. The debate over whether the courts or the legislature is the proper body to recognize the mature minor doctrine
is evidenced by the strong concurrence and dissents in
Cruzan,242 and the dissents in In re E.G., 243 and Rosebush,244 as
239. Hon. Sol Wachtler, A Judge's Perspective: The New York Rulings, LAW,
& HEALTH CARE, Spring-Summer 1991 at 60, 62.
240. See supra notes 177 and 196.
241. The Tennessee Supreme Court premised its decision in Cardwell on the
fact that it did not find any indication that the Tennessee Legislature intended to
occupy the entire area of medical treatment for minors. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at
744. For a discussion of Cardwell, see supra notes 42-60.
242. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Justice Scalia contended that "the federal courts
have no business in this field" and that "it [was] up to the citizens of [the states] to
decide, through their elected representatives, whether that wish would be
honored." Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, along with Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, stated: "the State has no legitimate general interest in
someone's life, completely abstracted from the interest of the person living that
life, that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical treatment". Id. at
313. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. 549 N.E.2d at 329. The dissent argued that the court should not have
expanded the common law to enable mature minors to refuse life-sustaining treatment, stating:
Unless the legislature for specific purposes provides for a different age, a
minor is one who has not attained legal age. It is not disputed that E.G. has
not attained legal age. It is fundamental that where language is clear there
is no need to seek to interpret or depart from the plain language and meaning and read into what is clear exceptions or limitations.
Id. at 329 (Ward, J., dissenting).
244. 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). Noting the primary distinction
between judicial and legislative acts, Judge Sawyer stated that "[t]he [I]egislature
makes the law - - courts apply it ....
The legislature prescribes rules for the
future. The judiciary ascertains existing rights." Id. at 642 (Sawyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting In re Forwarding Co., 292 N.W. 678 (Mich.
MEDICINE
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well as the opinion of New York's second department in Alfonso. 245 The separation of powers doctrine mandates that the
legislatures make the law while the courts interpret the law.
The former Chief Judge of New York State, Sol Wachtler, stated
that "only the legislature can formulate guidelines and rules
and speak to cases which have not yet come into court and eliminate the legal uncertainty which only adds to the cost and
anguish of those forced to make these painful medical
choices." 24 Judge Wachtler called for the creation "of a body of

law which anticipates the problems and provides solutions
before they arise so that those facing a crisis in the hospital do
not also have to face a crisis in the courtroom."247 Current Chief
Judge of New York State, Judith Kaye, described the proper
role of the legislature and the courts: "Statutes are limits; the
court's focus is to implement the will of the legislature, not its
own will."

248

New York statutory law currently affords minors the right
to consent to certain medical treatments such as treatment for
venereal disease, inpatient mental health treatment, and substance abuse treatment. 249 This statutory right to consent to
specified medical treatment must not be equated with the right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 250 While courts in other jurisdictions 2 1 have created exceptions to the general rule that
parental consent is required to treat or to refuse to treat minors,
the New York Court of Appeals is not the appropriate forum in
1940) (citations omitted). Judge Sawyer further stated that judicial power extends
only so far as interpreting the legislature's enacted law. Id.
245. 195 A.D.2d 46, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1993). The court concluded
that "[It is for the Congress or the [New York] Legislature, not the courts - and
certainly not the State Commissioner of Education or a Board of Education - to
provide the exceptions to the parental consent requirements." Id. at 54, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 264.
246. Wachtler, supra note 239, at 62. Judge Wachtler noted that the legislature's ability to hold hearings to "fully explore the medical, legal and moral implications of the advances in medical technology" made the legislature the proper
body to enact law in this area. Wachtler, supra note 239, at 62.
247. Wachtler, supra note 239, at 62.
248. Hon. Judith S. Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate Judging: A
BriefReflection on a Timeless Concern, 73 CORNELL L.REv. 1004, 1015 (July 1988).
249. See supra notes 177 and 196.
250. See supra note 208.
251. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (IlM. 1989); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202,
1205 (Me. 1990); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987).
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which to expand these limited statutory rights currently accorded minors in New York. The New York Legislature should
create a law that reflects the will of the citizens of New York
with regard to the rights of mature minors to refuse medical
treatment.
B.

A Starting Point: The Task Force on Life and the Law

The Task Force proposals 252 and the most recent New York
Assembly and Senate bills 253 provide a starting point in addressing the right of minors with decision-making capacity to
forego life-sustaining treatment. The Midwest Bioethics Committee's guidelines 254 provide additional insight into the struggle to find the proper balance between the competing patient,
parental and state interests in recognizing the right of mature
minors to forego life-sustaining medical treatment.
The Task Force was correct in recommending that the age
of majority for deciding about health care should not be lowered, 255 and that the determination of a minor's decision-making capacity should be made on a case-by-case basis. 256 This
recommendation comports with the current statutory rights en257 If
abling minors to consent to limited medical treatments.
the New York Legislature simply lowered the age of majority
for refusing life-sustaining treatment, it would negate New
York's recognition of the fact that children acquire different
258
levels of capacity based upon their specific life circumstances.
The case-by-case approach also comports with the Rule of Sevens' presumption of incapacity for minors of certain ages, and
the burdens that must be overcome to rebut that
259
presumption.
The Task Force did not, however, properly balance the subjective element of self-determination with the objective parens
patriae element in the decision to withhold life-sustaining medical treatment of minors found to have decision-making capacity.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

supra note 19, at 130.
N.Y.A. 6791, 218th Sess. (1995); N.Y.S. 5020, 218th Sess. (1995).
See supra note 18.
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 130.
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 130.
See supra note 177.
See PROSSER AND KEETON, § 18 at 115 (5th ed. 1984).
See Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 745.
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE,
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The Task Force correctly recognized that "[c]hildren should be
involved in decisions in a way that respects their developing capacity and maturity."260 Recognition of the subjective factor of
self-determination 261 enabled the Task Force to give great
weight to the decisions of mature minors to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment by according these minors a substantial, non-exclusive role in decisions regarding refusal of lifesustaining treatment. 262 Although the Task Force stated that
the correct balance should respect the self-determination interest of a mature minor, the parental interest in speaking for
their children on health care issues, and the state interest in
preserving life, the state's parens patriae interest appears to
have been overlooked.
C.

The Role of Health Care Providersand the Courts in
Determining Decision-Making Capacity and
Balancing Competing Interests

Although the Task Force gave substantial weight to deci263
sions made by mature minors to refuse medical treatment, its
proposals should be re-examined with regard to what entity determines whether or not the minor has the capacity to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment. The Task Force proposed
that the treating physician, in conjunction with the parents,
would be responsible for assessing the decision-making capacity
of minors.264 This proposal should be re-examined in order to
arrive at the proper balancing of the state's interest in preserving life.
Neither the Task Force proposals nor the current legislative bills would allow the courts to make the initial determination of decision-making capacity. Instead, each proposed that a
single health care provider make this important threshold determination. This is clearly a dangerous proposition. Current
law recognizes that adults are presumed to have capacity to
make their own health care decisions, and a finding to the contrary requires an additional health care provider to concur with
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 119.

See supra note 29.
supra note 19, at 130.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 217-18.
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE,
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the treating physician's finding. 26 5 The Task Force proposal
only requires one physician or health care provider to determine
that the minor in question has decision-making capacity. If a
single health care provider makes the initial determination of a
minor's decision-making capacity, the minor would not be provided an important safeguard which adults are given by law.
Requiring that an additional health care provider concur with
the treating physician's finding that the minor has decisionmaking capacity would comport with the Midwest Bioethics
Center's desire for greater confidence when determining the mi266
nor's decisional capacity.
The Task Force's erroneous belief that conflict between minors who wished to forego life-sustaining treatment and their
parents would be rare appears to have played a significant role
in its proposals. 267 Benny Agrelo's 268 and Billy Best's 269 decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment, which directly conflicted with their parents' wishes that they continue treatment,
indicate that conflicts between parents and their minor children
may be more common. Furthermore, the Task Force failed to
set forth appropriate guidelines for bioethics committees to fol270
low in order to resolve such conflicts.
By requiring only one health care provider opinion, the
Task Force failed to provide an appropriate safeguard in the
event the treating physician erroneously determined a minor
had decision-making capacity. Under the Task Force's formulation, the courts would not have the primary function to determine whether a particular minor has decision-making
capacity. 271 While courts are not necessarily more capable of
making such determinations, 272 judicial precedent would provide the necessary guidelines which are missing from the Task
Force proposal. Additionally, the state's interest in protecting
the health and welfare of minors within its jurisdiction is better
served by including additional safeguards.
265. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2963(2) and (3)(a) (McKinney 1993).
266. MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, supra note 19, at § 7.4.

267.

NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE,

supra note 19, at 131.

268. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
270. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 138.
271. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 132.
272. See supra note 218.
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The inherent problem with the Task Force's single health
care provider determination comes to light under the following
scenario. If the treating physician's determination that the minor in question has decision-making capacity is based on the
physician's limited exposure to children within that age
bracket, there is a strong possibility that this initial determination may be incorrect. Assuming parental consent is not forthcoming, the bioethics review committee would then attempt to
resolve the conflict between the minor and the parents. Under
this scenario, at no time would New York State's interest in preserving life and protecting minors be balanced into the equation. Additionally, the bioethics review committee would not be
in a position to review the treating physician's initial determination of decision-making capacity.
New York State's interest in preserving life and in protecting the health and welfare of minors within its jurisdiction is
greatest when a minor desires to refuse life-sustaining treatment, as this decision may ultimately result in the minor's
death. Legislation expanding the rights of minors to include
the mature minor exception should either give the courts a role
in determining decision-making capacity, or include the same
safeguards afforded adults who are found to be incapable of
making their own health care decisions (the concurrence of two
health care providers). Any proposed legislation should set
forth more comprehensive guidelines for health care providers
to follow in making the threshold determination of capacity and
should require that the parental and state interests be properly
represented when the mature minor's desire to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment is given substantial weight.
Conclusion
The mature minor doctrine recognizes that certain minors
may have the decision-making capacity to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. 273 New York law currently allows mature
minors to consent to limited, specific medical treatments, without prior parental consent. 27 4 The question of whether mature
minors should have the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
273. See Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 744.
274. See supra note 177.
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treatment poses a different question than the right to consent to
medical treatment. The New York State Legislature is the
proper body to determine whether its constituency favors expanding the rights of mature minors to include the refusal of
life-sustaining medical treatment.
The decision to provide mature minors with this expanded
right of self-determination necessarily involves the balancing of
competing interests, namely those of the minor, the parents and
the state. The minor's decision to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment should only be carried out if, (1) the minor is deemed
to have decision-making capacity, and (2) the minor's interest in
refusing life-sustaining treatment is greater than (a) the parental interest in their minor child's health care choices, and (b)
New York State's interest in preserving life.
Enacting a law which gives mature minors a substantial,
although not exclusive, role in medical decisions would recognize that certain minors have the requisite decision-making capacity to play a role in their health care choices. At the same
time, any mature minor exception enacted in New York should
recognize that minors are presumed incapable of refusing medical treatment, and the presumption could only be overcome if
(1) the treating physician and another health care provider or
(2) the courts, determined that the minor had decision making
capacity.
Much more discussion and debate is needed before the New
York Legislature enacts a law recognizing the mature minor
doctrine. The struggle to find the most appropriate assessment
of decision-making capacity will eventually enable New York
State to adopt a law which would abandon the adage: "Children
should be seen and not heard."
Joan-MargaretKun
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